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中华人民共和国全国人民代表大会常务委员会委员长令（五届第13号） (附英文)

中华人民共和国第五届全国人民代表大会第四次会议于1981年12月13日通过了《中华人民共和国外国企业所得税法》，现予公布，自1982年1月1日起施行。

委员长 叶剑英
1981年12月13日
中华人民共和国外国企业所得税法

（1981年12月13日第五届全国人民代表大会第四次会议通过 1981年12月13日全国人民代表大会常务委员会委员长令第十三号公布 自1982年1月1日起施行）

第一条 在中华人民共和国境内，外国企业的生产、经营所得和其它所得，都按照本法的规定缴纳所得税。
本法所称外国企业，除第十一条另有规定者外，是指在中华人民共和国境内设立机构，独立经营或者同中国企业合作生产、合作经营的外国公司、企业和其它经济组织。
第二条 外国企业每一纳税年度的收入总额，减除成本、费用以及损失后的余额，为应纳税的所得额。
第三条 外国企业的所得税，按应纳税的所得额超额累进计算，税率如下：
全年所得额不超过二十五万元的，税率为百分之二十；
全年所得额超过二十五万元至五十万元的部分，税率为百分之二十五；
全年所得额超过五十万元至七十五万元的部分，税率为百分之三十；
全年所得额超过七十五万元至一百万元的部分，税率为百分之三十五；
全年所得额超过一百万元的部分，税率为百分之四十。
第四条 外国企业按照前条规定缴纳所得税的同时，应当另按应纳税的所得额缴纳百分之十的地方所得税。
对生产规模小，利润低，需要给予减征或者免征地方所得税的外国企业，由企业所在地的省、自治区、直辖市人民政府决定。
第五条 从事农业、林业、牧业等利润率低的外国企业，经营期在十年以上的，经企业申请，税务机关批准，从开始获利的年度起，第一年免征所得税，第二年和第三年减半征收所得税。
按前款规定免税、减税期满后，经财政部批准，还可以在以后的十年内继续减征百分之十五至百分之三十的所得税。
第六条 外国企业发生年度亏损，可以从下一年度的所得中提取相应的数额弥补；下一年度的所得额不足弥补的，可以逐年提取所得继续弥补，但是最长不得超过五年。
第七条 外国企业缴纳所得税，按年计算，分季预缴。每季在季度终了后十五日内预缴；每年在年度终了后五个月内，汇算清缴，多退少补。
第八条 外国企业应当在每次预缴所得税的期限内，向当地税务机关报送预缴所得税申报表；年度终了后四个月内，报送年度所得税申报表和会计决算报表。
第九条 外国企业的财务、会计制度，应当报送当地税务机关备查。
外国企业的财务、会计处理办法同税法规定有抵触的，应当依照税法规定计算纳税。
第十条 外国企业依法开业、停业，应当持有关证件向当地税务机关办理税务登记。
第十一条 外国公司、企业和其它经济组织，在中国境内没有设立机构而有来源于中国的股息、利息、租金、特许权使用费和其它所得，应当缴纳百分之二十的所得税。税款由支付单位在每次支付的款额中扣缴。
按照前款规定缴纳的所得税，以取得所得的外国公司、企业和其它经济组织为纳税义务人，以支付所得的单位为扣缴义务人。扣缴义务人每次所扣的税款，应当于五日内缴入国库，并向税务机关报送扣缴所得税报告表。
国际金融组织贷款给中国政府和中国国家银行的利息所得，免征所得税。外国银行按照优惠利率贷款给中国国家银行的利息所得，也免征所得税。
外国银行在中国国家银行的存款和按照一般利率贷款给中国国家银行的利息所得，应当缴纳所得税；但是，中国国家银行在对方国内的存款、贷款利息所得不缴纳所得税的，可以相应给予免税。
第十二条 税务机关有权对外国企业的财务、会计和纳税情况进行检查；有权对扣缴义务人代扣代缴税款情况进行检查。外国企业和扣缴义务人必须据实报告，并提供有关资料，不得拒绝或隐瞒。
第十三条 外国企业的所得税以人民币为计算单位。所得为外国货币的，按照中华人民共和国国家外汇管理总局公布的外汇牌价折合成人民币缴纳税款。
第十四条 外国企业和扣缴义务人必须按照规定的期限，缴纳税款。逾期不缴的，税务机关除限期缴纳外，从滞纳之日起，按日加收滞纳税款的千分之五的滞纳金。
第十五条 外国企业违反本法第八条、第九条、第十条、第十二条规定的，税务机关可以酌情处以罚金。
扣缴义务人违反本法第十一条规定的，税务机关除限期追缴应扣未扣税款外，可以酌情处以应扣未扣税款的一倍以下的罚金。
外国企业偷税、抗税的，税务机关除追缴税款外，可以根据情节轻重，处以应补税款五倍以下的罚金。情节严重的，由当地人民法院依法处理。
第十六条 外国企业同税务机关在纳税问题上发生争议时，必须先按照规定纳税，然后再向上级税务机关申请复议。如果不服复议后的决定，可以向当地人民法院提起诉讼。
第十七条 中华人民共和国政府和外国政府之间订有税收协定的，按照协定的规定办理。
第十八条 本法的施行细则，由中华人民共和国财政部制定。
第十九条 本法自１９８２年１月１日起施行。
附
1． 中华人民共和国全国人民代表大会常务委员会委员长令（五届第13号）

相关文件
1． 关于《中华人民共和国外国企业所得税法草案》的说明

2． 中华人民共和国第五届全国人民代表大会法案委员会关于三个法律草案的审查报告







(Adopted at the Fourth Session of the Fifth National People'sCongress on December 13, 1981)

Whole Doc.

Article 1
Income tax shall be levied in accordance with this Law on the income
derived from production, business and other sources of any foreign
enterprise operating in the People's Republic of China.
"Foreign enterprises" mentioned in this law refer, with the exception
of those for whom separate provisions are stipulated in Article 11, to
foreign companies, enterprises and other economic organizations which have
establishments in the People's Republic of China engaged in independent
business operation or co-operative production or joint business operation
with Chinese enterprises.
Article 2
The taxable income of a foreign enterprise shall be the net income in
a tax year after deduction of costs, expenditures and losses in that year.
Article 3
Income tax on foreign enterprises shall be assessed at progressive
rates for the parts in excess of a specific amount of taxable income. The
tax rates are as follows:
Range of income Tax rate
(per cent)
-----------------------------------------------------
Annual income below 250,000 yuan . . 20
That part of annual income above 250,000
and up to 500,000 yuan . . . . . . 25
That part of annual income above 500,000
and up to 750,000 yuan . . . . . . 30
That part of annual income above 750,000
and up to 1,000,000 yuan . . . . . 35
That part of annual income above 1,000,000
yuan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
------------------------------------------------------
Article 4
In addition to the income tax levied on foreign enterprises in
accordance with the provisions of the preceding article a local income tax
of 10 per cent of the same taxable income shall be levied.
Where a foreign enterprise needs reduction in, or exemption from
local income tax on account of the small scale of its production or
business, or its rate of profit, this shall be decided by the people's
government of the province, municipality or autonomous region in which
that enterprise is located.

Article 5
A foreign enterprise scheduled to operate for a period of 10 years or
more in farming, forestry, animal husbandry or other low- profit
occupations may, upon approval by the tax authorities of an application
filed by the enterprise, be exempted from income tax in the first
profit-making year and allowed a 50 per cent reduction in the second and
third years.
With the approval of the Ministry of Finance, a 15 to 30 per cent
reduction in income tax may be allowed for a period of 10 years following
the expiration of the term for exemptions and reductions specified in the
preceding paragraph.
Article 6
Losses incurred by a foreign enterprise in a tax year may be carried
over to the next year and made up with a matching amount drawn from that
year's income. Should the income in the subsequent tax year be
insufficient to make up for the said losses, the balance may be made up
with further deductions against income year by year over a period not
exceeding five years.
Article 7
Income tax on foreign enterprises shall be levied on an annual basis
and paid in quarterly installments.
Such provisional payments shall be made within 15 days after the end
of each quarter. The final settlement shall be made within five months
after the end of a tax year. Excess payments shall be refunded by the tax
authorities or deficiencies made good by the taxpayer.
Article 8
Foreign enterprises shall file their provisional income tax returns
with the local tax authorities within the period prescribed for
provisional payments. The taxpayer shall file its final annual income tax
return together with its final accounts within four months after the end
of the tax year.
Article 9
The method of financial management and the system of accounting of
foreign enterprises shall be submitted to local tax authorities for
reference.
Where the method of financial management and the system of accounting
of foreign enterprises are in contradiction with the provisions of the Tax
Law, tax payments shall be assessed according to the provisions of the Tax
Law.
Article 10
Foreign enterprises shall present relevant certificates to the local
tax authorities for tax registration when they go into operation or close
down in accordance with law.

Article 11
A 20% income tax shall be levied on the income obtained from
dividends, interest, rentals, royalties and other resources in China by
foreign companies, enterprises and other economic organizations which have
no establishments in China. Such tax shall be withheld by the paying unit
in each of its payments.
For the payment of income tax according to the provisions in the
preceding paragraph, the foreign companies, enterprises and other economic
organizations which earn the income shall be the taxpayer, and the paying
unit shall be the withholding agent. Taxes withheld on each payment by a
withholding agent shall, within five days, be turned over to the State
Treasury and the income tax return submitted to the tax authorities.
Income from interest on loans given to the Chinese Government or
China's state banks by international finance organizations shall be
exempted from income tax. Income from interest on loans given at a
preferential interest rate by foreign banks to China's state banks shall
also be exempted from income tax.
Income derived from interest on deposits of foreign banks in China's
state banks and on loans given at a normal interest rate by foreign banks
to China's state banks shall be taxed. However, exemption from income tax
shall be granted to those foreign banks in whose countries income from
interest on deposits and loans of China's state banks is exempted from
income tax.
Article 12
The tax authorities have the right to investigate the financial
affairs, account books and tax situation of any foreign enterprise, and
have the right to investigate the withholding situation of any withholding
agent. Such foreign enterprises and withholding agents must make reports
on fact and provide all relevant information and shall not refuse to
co-operate or conceal any facts.
Article 13
Income tax levied on foreign enterprises shall be computed in terms
of Renminbi (RMB). Income in foreign currency shall be assessed according
to the exchange rate quoted by the State General Administration of
Exchange Control of the People's Republic of China and taxed in Renminbi.
Article 14
Foreign enterprises and withholding agents must pay their tax within
the prescribed time limit. In case of failure to pay within the prescribed
time limit, the appropriate tax authorities, in addition to setting a new
time limit for tax payment, shall surcharge overdue payments at one half
of one per cent of the overdue tax for every day in arrears, starting from
the first day of default.

Article 15
The tax authorities may, acting at their discretion, impose a penalty
on any foreign enterprise which has violated the provisions of Article 8,
9, 10 and 12 of this Law.
In dealing with those withholding agents who have violated the
provisions of Article 11 of this Law, the tax authorities may, in addition
to setting a new time limit for the payment of the part of tax that should
have been withheld and, at their discretion, impose a penalty of not more
than the amount that should have been withheld.
In dealing with foreign enterprises which have evaded or refused to
pay income tax, the tax authorities may, in addition to pursuing the tax,
impose a fine of not more than five times the amount of tax underpaid or
not paid, according to how serious the offence is. Cases of gross
violation shall be handled by the local people's courts according to law.
Article 16
In case of disputes with tax authorities about tax payment, foreign
enterprises must pay tax according to the relevant regulations first
before applying to higher tax authorities for reconsideration. If they do
not accept the decisions made after such reconsideration, they can bring
the matter before the local people's courts.
Article 17
Where agreements on tax payment have been concluded between the
Government of the People's Republic of China and the government of another
country, matters concerning tax payment shall be handled in accordance
with the provisions of these agreements.
Article 18
Detailed rules and regulations for the implementation of this Law
shall be formulated by the Ministry of Finance of the People's Republic of
China.
Article 19
This Law shall come into force as of January 1, 1982.



1981年12月13日



关于《中华人民共和国外国企业所得税法草案》的说明

　　财政部副部长 谢明

我受国务院的委托，现对《中华人民共和国外国企业所得税法草案》，作一简要说明。
中外合资经营企业所得税法公布施行后，对在我国境内的中外合资经营企业征收所得税的问题已经解决。但是，对在我国境内设立机构，独立经营或同我国企业合作生产经营的外国企业，以及不在我国境内设立机构，而有来源于中国的股息、利息、租金、特许权使用费等项所得的外国企业，还没有相应的征税办法。目前外国企业在我国境内设立机构、经营业务的有几百家，同我国合作经营的外国企业在广东、福建等地不断增加，中外合作开发石油、煤炭的工作也正在进行，我国海上石油的开发将在近期内进行招标。因此，制订和颁布外国企业所得税法，是当前一项紧迫的工作。
根据这一情况，为了有利于吸引外资，加快发展我国对外经济合作和技术交流，发展我国经济，我们草拟了一个对外国企业征收所得税的规定。经过与有关部门多次座谈讨论，向福建、广东两省的同志征求意见。并就税法中的主要内容，向国内外税收法律专家进行了咨询调查。现在送请审议的这个税法（草案），是反复研究形成的。
一、关于所得税的税率设计
所得税的税率问题，是这个法的核心问题。总的考虑，税率要合理，以达到既能吸引外国企业来华投资，又不损害我国权益的目的。对在我国境内设立机构、独立从事生产经营的外国企业，以及同我国企业合作生产经营的外国企业，从我国实际出发，根据利多多征、利少少征和同等对待的原则，我们在税法（草案）中采用了超额累进税率的办法征收所得税。即按企业所得额的大小，分订五级税率：最低一级是年所得额不满25万元（人民币，下同）的部分，税率为20％；最高一级是企业年所得额超过100万元的部分，税率为40％。在征收所得税的同时，另按企业年所得额征收10％的地方所得税。按照现在设计的税率，它的好处是：
第一，对所有外国企业，不分国籍，不分行业，包括石油在内，都用一个税法征税，符合国际上的通常作法。这样，有利于外国企业在我国缴纳的所得税，得到本国政府的抵免，并为我国政府与外国政府签订税收协定奠定法律基础。
第二、外国企业所得税，用累进税率征收，可以适应大小企业的不同情况。把所得税和地方所得税合起来试算，一些大企业年所得额一般在1000万元以上，负担率可达48.75％至49.87％；而广东、福建等地的合作经营企业，年所得额多数在50万元以下，所得税负担率只有30％至32.5％。这不仅低于一些发达国家的所得税负担水平，而且低于一些发展中国家的负担水平。
第三，这次对外国企业只征收所得税和地方所得税，不征收汇出利润所得税。这样做，可以避免与外国在税收抵免等问题上发生矛盾。
二、关于预提所得税
税法（草案）规定，外国企业在我国境内没有设立经营机构，而有来源于中国的股息、利息、租金、特许权使用费等项的所得，应缴纳20％的所得税，税款由支付单位在支付款项时代扣代缴。这就是通常所说的预提所得税。目前许多国家都征收这种税，税率一般在20％至30％之间。考虑到我国对外经济合作日益发展，付给外国企业的上述各项支出将不断增加。如果我们不征税，外商照样要向本国政府缴税。同时，我国个人所得税法规定，对个人取得上述收入也要征收20％的所得税。因此，对这些外国企业的收入按20％的税率征收预提所得税，是必要的合理的。
三、关于减税、免税
这个税法（草案）中，对需要在税收上给予鼓励和照顾的，也作了规定。例如，对于从事农业、林业、牧业等利润率低的企业，从开始获利的年度起，可以免征所得税和地方所得税1年，减半征收2年。减免税期满后，从第四年开始的以后10年内，经过批准还可以给予减税15％至30％的照顾。例如，对国际金融组织贷款给中国政府和中国国家银行的利息所得，以及外国银行按照优惠利率贷款给中国国家银行的利息所得，可以免予征收预提所得税。又如，对生产规模小、利润少的外国企业，省、市、自治区人民政府还可以根据国家政策和发展本地区经济的需要，给予适当减征或者免征地方所得税。所有这些减税免税规定，对于我们利用外国资金进行社会主义现代化建设，是有积极作用的。
这个税法（草案）是否妥当，请审议。





Student:Dayong Zhou

dayong_77@hotmail.com


The Collectivizationa and De-collectivization in Rural China

周大勇 (Zhou,Dayong)

Abstract: the process of de-collectivization took place 25 years ago, however it was uncompleted, which determined that china has to make great effort to continue his rural reform, in order to liberate the peasant and the status of rural region as the Party promised. In China, the non-privatization reform occurred along with the de-collectivization was a uncompleted reform, which remains the defects of both collectivization and small-scale peasant economy, therefore it restricts the development of the rural society, however, the current system seems unable also reluctantly to change it. This paper intents to introduce the process of the collectivization and the most important rural reform in this century, namely the de-collectivization, the demonstrates the progression of de-collectivization, its characters as well as the problems left to be solve.
Keywords: collectivization De-collectivization collective ownership incomplete

Foreword
I am pleased that I am allowed to write the term paper about China. China was influenced by Marxism and walked in detour of history for half century. Before Marxism bankrupted in former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe countries, China had adopted a different way to reform from those countries. Because of the difference in aspects of historical evolution, political forms and natural environment, it’s hard to compare the rural society of China with these former socialism countries directly, also, the progression of collectivization and its end are different in two continents.
Rural china before collectivization
Collectivization was a mark system of the socialist state. Although in the era of Utopian socialism, Robert Owen for example has already attempted to set up the collective farm, but it wasn’t pursued by force strength of government. Even the founder of communism Marx didn’t agree that communism could be realized in undeveloped countries with extremely poor productivity . It was Russia, the serf country, in which Communist took power without adequate preparation; collectivization was implemented by force, in order to consolidate the rule in grass-root countryside. This experience has influenced China and Eastern Europe, because one of the merits of the collectivization lies in being easy to be managed, the other lies in being easy to deprive peasants.
China was a backward country, which suffered from ignorance and war for centuries. Throughout the centuries some 80 to 90 percent of the Chinese population were farmers and live in one of some 900,000 villages, which have an average population of from 1,000 to 2,000 people. Villages were not self-contained, self-sufficient units. Clusters of villages centered on small market towns, which linked them to the wider economy and society by providing not only opportunities to buy and sell but also opportunities for entertainment, information, social life, and a host of specialized services. The traditional Chinese elite, often referred to in English as the gentry dispersed across the country and often lived in rural areas, where they were the dominant figures on the local scene, normally ruled villages. Although they held land, which they rented to tenant farmers, they neither possessed large estates like European nobles nor held hereditary titles. However, they traditionally interpreted central policies and national values for villagers. As in feudal relationship, the peasants and gentry live depend on each other. Gentry provided land to poor peasants and tenant, and work with rich and middle peasants to secure the order in village, for instance opening school and building basic infrastructures to maintain there social status. In Chinese history, at the beginning of very dynasty, the land relationship between landlord and poor peasants were comparably fair, that meant, peasant have parcel farmland to live on. But land tended to be concentrated on end every dynasty, then there might be a peasant uprising led to a new dynasty and retribution of land. This is the basic clue of social evolution in China before communist period.
After the Chinese Communist Party came into power in mainland, it had to keep its promise, which it made during the period of war to encourage the peasant to join the army, that it would gave peasant their own land. The first major action took place from 1940s to early 1950s. June 1950, a new Land Reform Law of new People’s Republic was promulgated and stipulated nullification of the feudal land ownership system, and institutionalization of the system of land ownership by peasants, in which the Party sent agents to every village to carry out the land reform policy. This in itself was an unprecedented show of political power and the resolution of transform an old society. The reform was successful, because the peasants supported the policy; most of them had been waiting for the reform for long time. In the light of the reform law, land were redistribute from the landlords, land-owning trusts or wealthier families to the poor segments in the same village; village elites, who might be expected to go up against the Party and its programs were brought down; new leadership was established by poor peasants who showed the most loyalty to the party's goals; instead of kinship group or patron-client ties, class status became new relationship among villagers.
the process of Collectivization
However, the Party’s leaders were not satisfied with the privatization of land, at one hand, such ownership, according to the doctrine of socialism, should have been abolished in the state of socialism, at another hand, private ownership of small peasantry had no function of property accumulation for the country. At that time, in order to accelerate the construction of socialism, China had launched The First Five-Year Plan after the Soviet model; heavy industry development was profound stressed since the leaders of Communist Party regard socialist country as a country with developed industry sectors. However, the situation in early 1950s was not ideal for a new country. Pressing of needs for food in a country with burgeoning population, domestic capital for investment, and purchase of Soviet-supplied technology, capital equipment, and military hardware. To satisfy these needs, collectivize agriculture was put forward. Collectivization was regard as a method to turn countryside to stabile backing, which can be managed as semi-military and had rare contact with outside, so that the government could press the price of agricultural products by means of scissors difference between cities and countryside, and seize huge numbers of profit from agriculture economies to support the industrialization in city. At the same time, the government had already nationalized banking, industry, and even trade. Private enterprise was already virtually abolished in national wide.
Despite internal disagreement as to the speed of collectivization, preliminary collectivization was launched since 1952. China's peasantry saw Chairman Mao and the Communist Party as heroic much more than Russia's peasantry had seen Stalin and the Bolsheviks as heroes, and through 1956 the peasantry cooperated with the Party. There was none of the resistance and warfare that had accompanied the collectivization of agriculture in the Soviet Union.
The collectivization of agriculture was basically completed with the establishment of the people's communes in 1958. The People’s Commune system was defined as a unity of politics and production, in which all members of the commune jointly owned property. Essentially, the commune system was based on private contract of its members and the principle of voluntaries and mutual benefit, however, it turned out yet as coercive institutional arrangement, which was made by government with political power. In the movement to achieve the People’ s Commune, peasants had no choice whether or not to join.
Communes were designed as large, embracing scores of villages created by combining some 20 or 30 advanced producers' cooperatives of 20,000 to 30,000 members on average, in some cases the membership varied from as few as 6,000 to over 40,000. It was instituted as an organization with functions of the lowest level of local government and the highest level of organization in agricultural production. Communes consisted of three organizational levels: the central commune administration; the production brigade , and the production team, which generally consisted of around thirty families. This kind of institution was an organization of hierarchies, in which the commune acted as political unit and top manager, the brigades played role of co-coordinators between the commune and the basic production teams. The production team was basic units of production and accounting. Since the people’s commune system was a tool established to extract resources from agriculture sector for industrialization, as a result, it neglected peasants’ incentive completely. In order to let the people’s commune system run, the central government designed an relative effective mechanism to encourage managers in each hierarchy to work enthusiastically, yet, in each level, the managers were treated differently and there was a clear difference in aspects of identity and welfare between the managers of the commune and of the brigades or production teams.
The commune was defined as administrative organ and executed the central government’s orders, and paid from central government’s budget, therefore the managers in the level of commune were “state cadres” , that means they were formal governmental officials and got wage monthly. These state cadres could be promoted and became officials of governmental divisions in higher level. Brigades and production teams were collective economic organizations, their running expenses came from production teams’ tribute. Managers in brigades level were called “collective cadres” . They were remunerated in their own production teams according to their labor quotas. Their wage was paid in the form of products instead of money. Managers in production teams were“team cadres”, they were also members of the production team. They worked as peasant like their workmates, and were paid in products according to labor quotas. Team cadres could be promoted to collective cadres. Collective and team cadres had little possibilities to be promoted and became members of state cadres. Nevertheless, as collective and team cadres had some privileges. For example, collective managers had the power of assigning state’s delivery quotas and production tasks among production teams, they determined who could enrolled in state-owned factories, universities and army. The production team managers executed the power of assigning work and distributing products among collective members. Furthermore, in the period of many political movements and class struggles, the identity of cadre could protect their families, relatives and themselves from being denounced and bullied (Tan, 1999).
At beginning, the commune itself was decorated as the representation of socialist society and had all merits of public ownership. Although nearly all the private property had been deprived, peasants had to praise the new system profusely. it was true, most poor peasants found that their lives changed, by eating in the public dining they didn’t need to worry about their own budget anymore, and by working together, they were not necessary to try their best. Following propaganda appeared in newspapers everyday:
The public dining halls are distributed in a way that members need walk only a few minutes from their homes to take their meals. On the freshly whitewashed walls of the one on Shihfuchien Street, a typical establishment, there is a big slogan in red, which reads, "High Spirits for Higher Production!" Its kitchen, to which the visitor is drawn by the aroma of food and the clatter of pots, is managed by Tu Hsiu-chen, the first volunteer cook, who has since learned large-scale catering from the chef at one of the city's restaurants.
The walls of the spacious dining room are decorated with paintings, as a home might be. Its tables and chairs, though simple, are scrubbed to a shining cleanliness. The food is fresh and tasty -- vegetables are grown by the commune itself. The staff make a special point of studying the diet and preferences of old people, children, nursing mothers and members with ailments. There is a separate room for parents with small children, provided with low tables for the little ones.( People’s Daily, 1958)
However, in practice, this ideal, extremely centralized form commune didn’t keep running well in most areas. Very soon it became clear that in most cases the communes were too clumsy to carry out successfully all the managerial and administrative functions that were assigned to them. The cooperative led to low-efficiency, the advantages of large-scale productivity didn’t arrive as peasants anticipated, productivity began to drop and discontent emerged. The reason lies in insufficient utilization of resources and lack of incentive of peasants. At one hand, the output of cooperation comes from all members’ work, in which the tribute of single household is difficult to be measured. So that opportunism like shirking happened naturally very frequently. An effective way to prevent shirking is to have all members supervised, but the seasonal work and spatial diversity of agricultural productive activities make it difficult to totally supervise. At the other hand, although brigade and production team cadres were obliged to complete state’s planning and all kinds of deliveries, the control right and residual claim of the people’s commune system were in the state’s hand, these cadres at grass-level could not design any reasonable incentive mechanism to encourage peasants to work hard and produce according to reasonable natural condition, such as soil, irrigation and farm year. The way left for brigade and team cadres was to punish peasants by struggling against them or maltreatment. But the brigade and team cadres also belonged to members of production teams, they and their families lived in the same community with their subordinates as well, so punishing peasants could also make themselves in trouble. Moreover, under the property rights structure of the commune system, the rest of output was not belong to the commune, brigade or even production team, but to the governments of higher level. This made the supervisors’ effort unrelated to any reward. As a result, even the supervisor himself has not enough incentive to work and shirk himself sometimes. In a word, under such conditions of poor supervision, in which all the work was distributed equally among all members at the lowest level--production team, shirking became every member’s rational choice and further weakening the efficiency of the system (Lin,1990).
De-collectivization
To prevent peasants from slow down, shrinking and escaping in work, and assure the system could keep on moving, the party collected all productive equipments and forbid members in people’s commune engaging in private production and business on the one hand, and at same time deprived peasants’ right of migrating from countryside to city or between districts by means of household registration on the other hand. Nevertheless, such policies had no effect on improving incentive of peasants, but they formed at least political press on very member of people’s commune, because it turned out that everyone’s only routine is to stay in the commune and finish one’s task. Without the right to leave or get better than others, peasants commonly chose to work with little effort, e.g. a passive method, to evade production tasks assigned by leader. Little accumulation and shirking made countryside widely fall into poverty , rare rural region had good conditions to develop industry or to improve commerce, infrastructures went worse, productivity sank quickly. The most serious crisis for agricultural collectivization happened between 1959 and 1961. GNP decreased from 213.8 billion Yuan in 1958 to 180.0 billion Yuan in 1962, with an average annual reduction of 15.1% in gross industrial production value and an average annual reduction of 19.3% in gross agricultural production value from 1958 to 1960. Owing to the serious shortage of food, a great famine took place in the whole country and at least 30 million residents died (Tan, 2000). Discontent with such system broke out, in some areas, peasants didn’t want to relied so heavily on orders from above and made so little allowance for local conditions or local initiative. The severe crisis forced the Party to adjust their policies. From 1961 on, commune functions were reduced to administration and co-ordination, production team was confirmed as the basic unit of accounting, certain production decision making was delegated to production teams, which were allowed to retain some income to overcome problems of egalitarianism; households again allowed to have small private plots and sidelines for planting vegetables, and a limited opening markets for transaction between urban and rural areas. However, these adjustments didn’t mean to change the system of people’s commune, but only to prevent peasants from rebel. From 1966 to 1976 China suffered the disaster of Cultural Revolution , there were large institutional swings took place in this period, in which co-operative moved from small to large and from team to brigade to commune again, local free markets, sidelines and private plots was prohibited again, and political factors had a great influence on production decisions.
In late 1970s, after the Leader Chairman Mao passed away, the requirement for improving agricultural productivity came alive. Administrators in provincial-level units with extensive regions of low yields and consequent low standards of living began experimenting with new forms of tenure and production. To avoid frontal conflicts of wide scope with government’s policies and the main ideology, a gradual approach was adopted. The first step of reform was to divide the production team into groups and to fix yield quotas for each group. Each group signed a contract with production team, the contractual items included the conditions of using land, laborers, farm tools and draft animals, the expenditure, labor contribution, rewards for excessive labor contribution and so on. After completing the tasks assigned by the production team, the output could be distributed among work groups according to their labor quotas. And then, the further solution was put forward, namely the typical form of fixing quotas called “all-round contract”, which was initiated by a few brave peasant secretly in Fengyang county of Anhui province. this contract regulated, household was allowed to cultivated a certain parcel farmland in the group, if grain quotas assigned by the state and the collective accumulation were accomplished, the household could own all the residual output. In the light of the contract, peasants were given directly stimulation to produce. The experiment was deemed successful and popular, and it soon spread to all districts.
At another side, political situation was appropriate with the reform form below. In the Eleventh National Party Congress, held August 12- 18, 1977 proclaimed the formal end of the Cultural Revolution, blamed it entirely on the Gang of Four , and reiterated that "the fundamental task of the party in the new historical period is to build China into a modern, powerful socialist country by the end of the twentieth century." The reformer Deng Xiaoping was elected as vice chairman and back to political stage and suggested a series of reform plans, though many contradictions still were apparent, change of policy was regarded as necessary. Rehabilitations of Deng's associates and others sympathetic to these reform plans were stepped up. Not only were some of those purged during the Cultural Revolution returned to power, but also individuals who had fallen from favor as early as the mid-1950s were rehabilitated. It was a time of increased political activism.
In November 1980, the Central Committee of Communist Party of China issued the document Some Issues of Further Reinforcing and Improving the Responsibility System in Agricultural Production. This article manifest the first time that the Party accepted the production responsibility systems developing in practice. In the document fixed output quotas of farmland for each group and responsibility contracts in some specialized obligations were indicated, at the same time, the fixed output quotas for household was also regarded as positive. Under the encouragement of government’s policy and related support measures, plenty of production responsibility systems developed very rapidly in rural areas. In 1981, a wide deeper reform called fixing the contribute quote for each household (bao gan dao hu), which was much more radical, was implemented. In accordance to the system, all collective lands in production teams were to be distributed among households based on their population or laborers. The households could manage the lands, made production decisions by themselves, and bore the results. When tasks assigned by upper government and the collective accumulation, e.g. a certain quantity of grain and livestock, were completed, the remained products could be owned by the households and not distributed among members in the production team. Moreover, if the household made sure that they have enough ration, they had right to sell the left grain to state owned agricultural enterprises or consume them as they want, usually feeding livestock or making wine for example. That meant the model from Fengyang was finally admitted by Party. In October 1983, the Party and the State Counsel issued the document Notice of Separating the Co-operative from Politics and Setting Up the Township Government and required the cooperative to separate from local government. The act ordered that the people's communes were replaced by administrative townships. By the end of 1984, 98% of production teams had taken the reform of Household Responsibility System. It was until then, the collectivization system was dismantled completely.
Some Characters of De-collectivization and Problems left
No restitution
Yet, de-collectivization and the implement of the household responsibility system is neither a reform of the ownership of land nor a process of privatization. As we have mentioned above, after the Communist Party set up its own government in 1949, it started land reform and distributed lands to the poor from landlords and rich peasants. Peasant acquired parcels of land according to the labor forces, then land were registered under name of each household. Before the eve of collectivization, most of lands in rural China were legally privately owned. But when de-collectivization began, peasants did not get back their former lands again. The household responsibility system only distribute the right of manage and benefit of lands among households according to their population or laborers. So, the de-collectivization in China did not like that in most of East European countries such as Bulgaria, Czech, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia, but like that in Albania. That is to say, there was no restitution of land. However, in former East European Countries, whether restitution was implemented or not, the de-collectivization had symbiosis with privatization. In China, although during the process of de-collectivization there were in reality some opinions that lands should be restituted, such voices were not accepted, nor even discussed.
The reasons why restitution of land in the de-collectivization of rural China did not happen may lie in some historic reasons. First of all, although peasants in China had private ownership over lands before the collectivization, large percent of peasants owned farmlands that did not belong to them before, they obtain them from political transformation. Theoretically, violence can’t consist the legal reason of transfer of ownership over real estate, therefore even after the terrorize during the land reform at beginning of 1950s, the private ownership of lands, which was made out by the communist government, had not yet became stable and commonly accepted. However, the former landlord class had rooted off during the political movement, land contacts and register books of land title had been destroyed, no one dare to challenge the power of Communist Party anymore. Since the collectivization began soon after the land reform, the new established owner relationship was broken again, when de-collectivization came about, without supports from the central government, most of peasants only took the household responsibility system as another chance of equally distributing lands, just like the land reform in 1949. As to descendants of former landlord class, they might have not forgotten the experience of their poor ancestors’: claiming private right before the Party which regarding public ownership as universal truth is a dangerous deal.
Secondly, different from most country in former communist east European countries , in which farmers’ nominal ownership of lands was remained, even though their lands were requisitioned in collective farms without any payment, and so that it was easy for peasants in these countries to take back the land when the collective farms went over. On the contrary, in China, private ownership of land was totally abolished as soon as the people’s commune system was set up, after 20 years, the collective ownership had already fest basis. As a result, the transaction costs of restitution so high as to wipe it out. That means, even a peasant want to take back the former farmland which belonged to them, it’s very hard to him to collect the relevant evidences to support his claim, moreover, there was no legal justice process to support such application. So normal farmer would rather to accept the Household Responsibility System.
Finally, the key reason lies in the socialism system itself. Even though the Communist Party of had poor performance in leading the country and its people to wealth and happiness during socialist revolution, Chinese people have taken socialism as the characteristic of the country for grant, after all the slogan “ Socialism saved China” has been deeply impressed. So that even after the Culture Revolution, most people still propped up the Party. The Party led the rural reform and decided the de-collectivization. However, the reform is a “liberation of the rural productivity”, which suit the requirement of the Party. Because the Chinese Communist Party insisted that his mission is to realize socialism, and socialism is based on public ownership system. Collective ownership was deemed as one form of public ownership in rural regions, so that as China kept on the road of realizing socialism, “land in rural areas belong to collective” was certainly remained after rural reform, and regulated in the Constitution of 1982, which is valid till now.
At the time of de-collectivization, the dissolution of people’s commune and the wide implement of responsibility system were regard as a great innovation. According to the statistic, The Household Responsibility System did bring about a more prosperous agriculture in China. From 1978 to 1984, grain output in China increased at an annual average rate of 5% and the gross value of agriculture by 7.7% (Lin, 1997). In contrast with former European countries, the de-collectivization seems bring more benefit to Chinese peasants at beginning. So that at that time, rare peasant did realize that such a reform without transformation of ownership was incompletely. However, The natural shortcomings of the de-collectivization would surely bring a series of problems.
institutional problem: land distribution
As we showed above, the de-collectivization ran smoothly and the introduction of Household Responsibility System has got a great success, although it could not address everything as only an institutional innovation. After several years of practice, it has been already proved that there are a number of weaknesses and limitations remained from the incompletely de-collectivization. One has to confirm, that the collective ownership and contract system led to the inequity in both economic and political features.
In economic view, during the de-collectivization, farmland was distributed to individual households in form of fragmented farming units. The principle of land distribution was derived directly from collective ownership. Farmland in a village was owned by all of its members collectively. As a result, every member had equal right to claim on distribution of the land according to certain norm, which was based primarily on the size of the peasant family. In reality of China with abundant population and limited land, the amount can be distributed to each household was very small. Moreover, land differed from each other in terms of soil fertility, irrigation conditions, location and so on. In many cases, a household had to obtain pieces of land from each of the grades. as a result, the sum was not only insufficient but also disjointed and scattered around villages. Large areas of cultivated land were wasted in the form of paths and boundaries separating households' contract field. A survey conducted by the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture indicated that in 1986, among 7983 sample villages from 29 provinces, average cultivated area per household was 0.466 ha (7 mu) fragmented into 5.85 plots, each plot on average 0.08 ha (1.2 mu) (Ministry of Agriculture of China, 1993) . This fragmented structure of family farming has remained largely untouched after implement of contract system and has detained the possibilities of using relatively advanced mechanical agricultural equipment and infrastructures.
Under such system, farmers turned to be short-term in action. According to the distribute rule of land in household responsibility system, land is to distribute depended only on villager status, babies and villagers' new-comer such as newly married bride from other villages were all eligible claimants, which having equal rights to share equal amounts of land in this village; on the contrary, when a villager left or died, the right of land claim would automatically withdraw. As population increased, villages had to readjust the distribution structure, which further subdivided the farmland . The endless redistribution of farmland resulted in many problems, including: 1) the situation of a small and fragmented farming structure further deteriorated; 2) worrying about the risk of losing their land as well as investment, farmers had little incentives to improve land conservation and agricultural infrastructure - irrigated land, one of the most significant components of agricultural infrastructure in China, remained almost unchanged during the 1980s; 3) farmers over-exploited the soil to pursue short-term profits; 4) the course of land redistribution was also costly, it required labor and time in organization and execution. (Chen, 1999)
Another problem is that farmland was generally badly endowed with the appropriate human capital. Since egalitarianism was the general leading principle rule, which gave little consideration to interfamily differences such as labor capability, education and individual preference . As a result, some large households with a incomplete labor force could have comparably much more land to cultivate, meanwhile other smaller households, above all those specialized in agriculture, could have only inadequate land for full employment. Such kind of problem was much worse in rural areas experiencing rapid township or village industry and urbanization. In those region there was often deterioration in the agricultural labor force since most of capable labors tended not to work at home as a farmer. There were many who did not give priority to cultivation and at times even let the land lie unused. Consequently, the farmland was underutilized .
Upon preceding analyzing, we can see that, in order to pursue egalitarianism on surface in distribution of land, in the process of the de-collectivization sacrificed economic efficiency. Thus, if the land was private, then those difference arouse from distribution will decease after enough time, because the free market will lead to equal efficiency through the choose of market. However, such political background lacked from beginning on, so that the shortcoming of a non-privatization de-collectivization can’t be corrected or even be enlarged because of problem of political system.
One of the main reason is political structure over the collective ownership. First at grass-root level, it was usually the village head, who takes the power to decide distribution since decentralization. So that the cadre family or their relations will surely benefit from the distribution. Having a cadre in the family seems to be a certain prerogative in using their political status to accumulate wealth. At one hand, Village cadres may allocate more fertile parts of the village land to themselves and determined more favorable grain sales quotas for themselves. And also, cadres have more opportunity to build personal relationship with higher level and other important departments, rural credit banks or transportation companies for example, so that they have more chance to obtain material benefit than normal peasants. As we see, most of collective enterprises and private economies in rural areas have tight relationship with local governments, at the basic level, with villager cadres, most rural enterprisers are villager leader themselves. Furthermore, cadres and their relations generally tend to break the policy of birth control, because they are capable to support more family members, and their kin will strengthen their economic and political power in return.
At another hand, though according to the election regulation of rural cadre in china, these village cadre should be elected directly by villagers, who have common interest in the community, this rule has been almost never put into practice. Under one Party system and public ownership system, all important resources are gathered in the Party’s hand, as a result, instead of election, the opinion from higher level plays a significant role, in order to carry ort the policy of Party efficiently. In fact, two factors determine the candidates in appointment of village head, one is the relationship with official of higher level, and the other is kinship. Consequently, cadre family takes all advantages to maintain their power and status through such appointment. So, cadres in rural China don’t represent the benefit of their village members, but the power of the Party as well as the family, there is no possibility for peasants to claim equality or save their from suffering as a peasant.
In a word, after a short flourish in rural China, which came along with the de-collectivization and the implement of Household Responsibility System, most peasants have to face the irrational occupation and distribution system of farmland and the political system, which is impossible to change. Besides there was strict limitation prevent peasants from abandoning their responsible land and rushing into cities, so that the peasants found it is hard to change their situation or turn it more better and free. This may explain why in rural china exists always the tendency of over population but the income of household began to decrease only after less than 10 years from the de-collectivization. As a result, land reform in China has emerged as a difficult issue in rural areas of exchange between social equality and economic efficiency. It seems obvious that since the mid-1980s the wide rural society has been caught in this predicament: where social equality or equity worsened, and at same time economic efficiency held back.. According to statistics, average net income in countryside has been slowed down for years. In 2000, the household average income only reached 272 dollars, but the Gini coefficient in China base in urban and rural areas rose from 0.21 in 1978 to more than 0. 46.